We offerprovisional supportfora new cognitive approach to understanding and treating drug resistant auditory hallucinations in people with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Study 1 emphasises the relevance of the cognitive model by detailing the behavioural, cognitive and affective responses to persistent voices in 26 patients, demonstrating that highly disparate relationships with voices -fear, reassurance, engagement and resistance â€"¿ reflect vital differences in beliefs about the voices. All patients viewed their voices as omnipotent and omniscient. However, beliefs about the voice's identity and meaning led to voices being construed as either â€˜¿ benevolent' or â€˜¿ malevolent'. Patients provided cogent reasons (evidence) for these beliefs which were not always linked to voice content; indeed in 31 % of cases beliefs were incongruous with content, as would be anticipated by a cognitive model. Without fail, voices believed to be malevolent provoked fear and were resisted and those perceived as benevolent were courted.
with voices -fear, reassurance, engagement and resistance â€"¿ reflect vital differences in beliefs about the voices. All patients viewed their voices as omnipotent and omniscient. However, beliefs about the voice's identity and meaning led to voices being construed as either â€˜¿ benevolent' or â€˜¿ malevolent'. Patients provided cogent reasons (evidence) for these beliefs which were not always linked to voice content; indeed in 31 % of cases beliefs were incongruous with content, as would be anticipated by a cognitive model. Without fail, voices believed to be malevolent provoked fear and were resisted and those perceived as benevolent were courted.
However, in the case of imperative voices, the primary influence on whether commands were obeyed was the severity of the command. Study 2 illustrates how these core beliefs about voices may become a new target for treatment. We describe the application of an adapted version of cognitive therapy (CT)to the treatment of four patients' drug-resistant voices. Where patients were on medication, this was held constant while beliefs about the voices' omnipotence, identity, and purpose were systematically disputed and tested. Large and stable reductions in conviction in these beliefs were reported, and these were associated with reduced distress, increased adaptive behaviour, and, unexpectedly, a fall in voice activity. These changes were corroborated by the responsible psychiatrists. Collectively, the cases attest to the promise of CT as a treatment for auditory hallucinations.
Auditory hallucinations have a powerful impact on the lives of those who experience them (Falloon & Talbot, 1981) . However, the experience is also personal: some people experience them as immensely distressing and frightening whereas others are reassured and amused and many actually seek contact. Where some people shout and swear at voices and resist commands, others may harm themselves or other people at the voices' behest.
This diversity begs the question, how are the content and form of the voice, and the person's cognitive, affective and behavioural response, connected? That a link exists is well established. Romme & Escher (1989) used innovatory sampling methods to study hallucinations in clinical and non-clinical groups, and they showed how a person's ability to cope with voices varied according to his/her appraisalof the voices. Benjamin (1989) studied 30 hallucinators and found that all had meaningful, integrated and inter personally coherent relationships with their voices. In people diagnosed as schizophrenic these relationships were orderly and interpersonally â€˜¿ normal',but not always complimentary; these patients might claim that their voices liked them even though the content was hostile and attacking. Benjamin's clearly stated position (p. 293) is that the content of the voice is â€oe¿ directly responsibleâ€• for the person's behavioural and affective response.
The question arises as to why the individual should feel compelled to behave and respond affectively in such an apparently congruous manner. Recent work has suggested that essentially normal thought processes are involved in the way that delusional ideas are formed (Maher, 1988) and given up during recovery (Brett-Jones et al, 1987) . Indeed psychological research shows that whether ordinary people accept comments and advice, and comply with commands, depends in large part on their appraisal of the situation. For example, in Milgram's famous studies, whether ordinary individuals could be persuaded to administer what they believed to be a lethal electric shock to other subjects was strongly influenced by their beliefs about the experimenter's authority and power, their own degree of control, and the presumed consequences of disobedience (Milgram, 1974) .
Likewise, it is possible that the degree of fear, acceptance and compliance shown to voices might be mediated by beliefs about the voices' power and authority, the consequences of disobedience, and so on. For example, the belief that a voice comes from a powerful and vengeful spirit may make the person terrified of the voice and comply with its commands to harm others; however, if the same voice were construed as self-generated, the behaviour and affect might be quite different. This cognitive formulation of voices was inspired by Beck's cognitive model of depression(e.g. Becketa!, 1979) which proposes that the behavioural and affective symptoms are consequences of particular negative beliefs (e.g. â€oe¿ I am worthlessâ€•) and not antecedents (e.g. â€oe¿ She disagreed with meâ€•). This premise gave rise to cognitive therapy (CT) for unipolar depression (Beck et a!, 1979) , an effective treatment approach that relies heavily on the disputing and testing of beliefs. The applicability of the cognitive model to voices could have similar important implications for treatment, in that if beliefs about voices could be weakened, this might reduce associated distress and problem behaviour.
Useful progress in the cognitiveâ€"behavioural management of schizophrenic symptoms has been made in recent years, largely concentrated on positive symptoms (Birchwood & Tarrier, 1992) . There is growing evidence that secondary delusions may be weakened using CT (e.g. Fowler & Morley, 1989; Chadwick & Lowe, 1990 
Method
Fourteen men and 12 women were selected who had heard voices for at least two years; their average age was 35 years (range 23â€"59).All except one were receiving depot neuroleptic medication at All Saints ' Hospital, Birmingham; one was in hospital and the remainder were out-patients. All satisfied DSMâ€"IIIâ€"Rcriteria for schizophrenia or schizo affective diSOrder (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) .
All participants volunteered for the study, with no refusals. Each was asked whether he or she would be willing to meet with a psychologist to discuss the experience of hearing voices. It was made clear that the discussion would be confidential, and that information disclosed would neither be entered in the main case notes nor lead to a change in medication.
Interviewswereconductedby either one of the authors; in severalcasesit took more than one interviewto collect all relevant information.
Information was gathered using a semi-structured interview (details available from the authors on request). Interviews assessed the content of the voices, beliefs about voices, other collateral symptoms that were regarded as supporting the beliefs, other confirmatory evidence, and influence over the voice. voices were malevolent. Malevolence, the wish to do evil, took one of two forms: either a belief that the voice was a punishment for a previous misdemeanour, or an undeserved persecution. For example, Sl believed he was being punished by the Devil for having sinned, and S3 believed he was being persecuted without good reason by an ex-employer. Six people (S13â€"Sl8) believed the voices to be benevolent. Benevolence, the wish to do good, took a number of forms: to help the person maintain mental well being; to protect the person, often from malevolent voices; an advisory role; to help the person develop social power; to develop a personal interest in the person (e.g. marriage). For example, Sl4 believed that the voices were from God and were there to help develop a special power.
The third group (S19â€"S23) comprised five people who believed they heard a mLxture of benevolent and malevolent voices; a paradigm of this group was S23, who was tormented by a group of evil space-travellers and yet protected and nurtured by a guardian angel. The final three people (S24â€"S26)were uncertain about their voices because of an inconsistency or incongruity in what was said. â€˜¿ Uncertainty'was defined as having a strong doubt about the voice's identity, meaning or power, where this doubt was the result of the person's deduction. For example, S26 was certain that his voices wanted to help but observed that they had got things wrong: they wanted him to kill himself and move on to the next and better life, yet his religion told him that suicide is a sin and those who commit it go to hell.
Connection with voice content. The voice content was
frequently put forward as evidence for a particular belief. Thus it was commonly said that evil commands were evidence that the voice was bad, and kind protective words were evidence that the voice was good. Also, as we have seen, the belief in omnipotence was supported in all cases by the apparent omniscience of voices; they all â€˜¿ knew' about the person's private thoughts and actions, and many accurately foretold the future.
However, the class of beliefwas not always understandable in the light of voice content alone â€"¿ that is, in eight cases (31%) the beliefs appeared to be at odds with what was said. In the case of S2 and Sl2 the voice content was benign, yet these voices were construed as malevolent. The reverse was true of S26, whose voice called him a fool and told him to commit suicide and yet was construed as benevolent. Similarly, S24's voice told her to kill her family and herself; she believed the voice was God's and that he was giving her the chance to see her dead daughter by going to heaven. Again, S25 believed his voices to be benevolent in spite of them telling him to kill his daughter. S 15's voice told him to commit suicide and yet still was thought to be a benevolent goddess. 5 18's voices insulted her and told her to kill and yet were seen as benevolent. Perhaps most strikingly, S Il's voice identified itself as God and yet she disregarded this and believed it to be an evil force. because the voice issued warnings about possible danger. All three people who were uncertain about their voices experienced negative affect when these voices spoke.
Behaviouraland affective consequences

Compliance with commands
Although people had clear intentions about whether to comply with commands, at times these were compromised.
Compliance is governed by at least five factors. Firstly, compliance can be total (all commands obeyed in full), partial (only certain commands obeyed), or absent. Secondly, there is the general disposition to consider; malevolent voices are to be resisted and benevolent voices are to be courted. However, and thirdly, all people interviewed who heard imperative voices had additional beliefs about the consequences of obedience and disobedience (see Table I ).
Beliefs about disobedience varied in severity from being nagged to being killed. A fourth factor is the commands themselves â€"¿ voices may give innocuous commands (â€oemake a cup of teaâ€•,â€oe¿ watch your stepâ€•), or severe commands (â€oekill himâ€•), or both. Finally compliance would seem to be influenced by extra factors such as the person's mood, and the pressure and persistence of the voices â€"¿ patients who respond to such factors often present as losing tolerance for their voices. We feel it is helpful to classify commands as mild or severe (i.e. life-threatening).
Immediately one parameter can then be established. Fourteen voices (eight benevolent, six malevolent) gave only mild commands; all these C. But I don't obey Suicide is a sin because they don't I. None make sense benevolent voices were complied with willingly and in full, and all but one malevolent voice was complied with in full, although reluctantly â€"¿ the one exception was S3 (see Table 2 ). Severe commands were given by 12 voices (one benevolent, 11 malevolent) and all were currently being resisted. However, 10 of the 12 voices that gave severe commands also gave mild ones, and in all 10 cases these were obeyed at least occasionally. It is as if compliance with mild commands was an attempt to appease the voices' requirement for sterner actions. Of those people who were uncertain about the voice, two complied partially and one not at all.
Comment
The study offers striking support for the cognitive model. All the patientsdisplayedmuch â€oe¿ effort after Percentageconviction scores in all beliefs at the start of therapy, at its conclusion, and at follow-up beliefs that individuals hold about their voices. The weakening or loss of these beliefs is predicted to ease distress and facilitate a wider range of more adaptive coping strategies. The intervention briefly comprises the following components (a fuller account is in preparation: Chadwick & Birchwood, 1994).
Opening phase: engagement, education and rapport
It has already been suggested that powerful beliefs and emotions characterise patients' relationships with their voices. It follows that patients are likely to find the prospect of disengaging from their voices risky and uncomfortable. For this reason, it is essential that the therapist comes across as competent, trustworthy, and as understanding about voices. In our experience it helps if therapists acknowledge that they do not hear voices, but emphasise that they have spoken to many people who do and have learned about voices in this way. We believe it helps too if the therapist anticipates responses and makes predictions: â€oe¿ Usually the people I've spoken to are surprised or shocked by how much the voices know about themâ€•,or, â€oe¿ I expect the voices are worse at certain times of the day, and when you are under pressureâ€•. We always tell patients that they may withdraw from therapy at any point without penalty, and this may also reduce anxiety and facilitate engagement.
The central beliefs are defined at an early stage together with the evidence used to support them. The cost in terms of distress and disruption associated with the voices is specified, and it is made clear how much of this is a consequence of the beliefs about identity, power, meaning and compliance. The patient is asked to consider the advantages and disadvantages of these beliefs being false; because the meaningâ€• (Bruner, 1957) and this meaning frequently went well beyond the information given by the voices. On the basis of beliefs about presumed identity, omnipotence, and purpose, voices were believed to be either malevolent or benevolent, and it is this belief that seems to underlie people's behaviour towards voices. This distinction adequately explained important differences in distress and behaviour (though not compliance), and therefore questions the prevalent idea that people's coping response to voices emerges through trial and error or serendipity (e.g. Falloon & Talbot, 1981) .
These data are encouraging but preliminary, and need to be replicated on a wider scale. Also, the methodology needs to be operationalised and the measurements more objective. At present we are constructing a self-report measure of malevolence and benevolence, and this should show whether these concepts are mutually exclusive or in fact habitual dispositions that sometimes blur.
Study 2. Cognitive therapy (CT) with voices
In Study 1 we concluded that much distress and voice-driven behaviour is shaped by beliefs about the voices' power, identity and purpose. When voices are viewed from this cognitive perspective a new possible therapeutic approach is evident, namely, the distress associated with voices might be eased by weakening these beliefs. In Study 2 we describe a cognitive therapy we havedeveloped thatisintended to undermine the patients' central beliefs about auditory hallucinations in a systematic fashion. Four case summaries of the therapy in action are included as provisional evidence of its usefulness.
The cognitive treatment approach to hallucinations involves the elucidation and challenging of the core former usually outweigh the latter, this discussion may be used as an inducement to engage in therapy. However, it is emphasised that one acceptable outcome of therapy would be that the patient continue to hold his or her beliefs. Indeed, the whole therapy is conducted within an atmosphere of â€oe¿ collaborativeempiricismâ€• (Beck et a!, 1979 therapeutic process is â€˜¿ universality ' (Yalom, 1970) â€"¿ that is, the recognition that many others experience the same or similar problems. Secondly, it may prepare the patient for the later suggestion that the voices might be self-generated.
Disputing beliefs
Disputing a belief's veracity involves the use of two cognitive techniques: hypothetical contradiction and verbal challenge.
1-lypothelical contradiction (Brett-Jones et a!, 1987).
This measure is thought
to assess how open people are to evidence that contradicts their core beliefs. The patient is asked to consider how, if at all, a hypo thetical but contradictory occurrence would alter a belief. For example, in the present study one woman heard a voice commanding her to kill, which she believed to come from God. She was asked if this belief would be altered should a priest inform her that God would never command anyone to sin.
Verbal challenge (Chadwick & Lowe, 1990 involves first pointing out examples of inconsistency and irrationality, and then, offering an alternative explanation of events: namely, that the voices might be self-generated and that the beliefs are an attempt to make sense of them. An inconsistency might be discussed as follows: â€oe¿ You say that if you don't comply with commands you will be punished, maybe even killed; and yet you regularly resist the voices and these consequences have not occurredâ€•. Suggesting that the voices might be self-generated needs to be done carefully. It should be put forward as a possibility worth considering, not a certainty, and as a helpful way of making sense of things if the beliefs fail.
Testing beliefs empirically
In all the cognitive therapies, beliefs are subject to empirical test. We use two approaches to testing. On the one hand, we have a set procedure for testing the ubiquitous belief: â€oe¿ I cannot control my voicesâ€•. First, it is reframed as: â€oe¿ I cannot turn my voices on and offâ€•. The therapist then engineers situations to increase and then decrease the probability of hearing
voices. An initial thorough cognitive assessment should identify the cues that provoke voices, and one technique with a high likelihood of eliminating voices for its duration is concurrent verbalisation (Birchwood, 1986 It is essential to examine beforehand the implications of the test not bearing out the belief; if the belief will be modified or adapted, or whether the patient has a ready explanation for the outcome that leaves the belief untouched.
Case reports
Three out-patients and one in-patient were referred by psychiatrists because of drug-resistant and troublesome auditory hallucinations (all had participated in Study 1). One was not on medication, one had medication withdrawn shortly after the intervention started and reinstated at a lowerdosejust before it closed, and two wereon established and stable regimesthatwere not altered atallduringthe study. All satisfied DSMâ€"IlIâ€"R criteria for schizophrenia or schizoaffective disorder. Cases 1, 2 and 4 were treated by MB and case 3 jointly by MB and PC.
Case I. M
M is a 34-year-old married woman of Iranian origin with a three-year historyof schizoaffective disorder. Onset followedthedissolutionof herfirstmarriageandwasmarked by visualhallucinationsof the IslamicprophetMasumaand accompanying auditory hallucinations in Arabic. At the time M experienced a significant depression. The visions and depression resolved, but the voice remained and resisted neuroleptic treatment. For several months before the study, and throughout it, M was not on medication.
The voice was ever present and offered advice on her functioning as housewife (e.g. telling her to try new recipes), mother (e.g. telling her when to change a nappy) and wife (e.g. advising how to please her husband). M felt great reverence for the voice and it directed the majority of her behaviour. To most observers,includingher husband, M was increasingly undermined by her voices and was losing all confidence in her own judgement.
Four beliefs were identified concerning the voice's identity, purpose and power (see Table 2 ). Engagement was initially a problem because the voice was superficially so supportive.
Also, M disclosed that previous attempts to be independent of the voice had dissolved once the voice said: â€oe¿ Remember your faithâ€•. Dependence was also reinforced by fear that if left alone she might fail in her different functions as wife and parent.
Belief 3, that she could not think without the voice, was weakest and therefore tackled first. The main piece of evidence was that the voice was involved in all day-to-day decisions. However, a detailed diary revealed that over a week 5807o of her actions were voice-driven, 32% were self governed, and lOÂ°lorepresented a rejection of the voice's advice. M was impressed by this result. The belief about controlling the voice was refuted in the standard manner of switching it on and off. Belief 2, that the voice helped her through personal difficulties, rested on two points: that it gave good advice and that it predicted the future. However, discussion clarified that the predictions had high probability â€"¿ perhaps that the husband would be home at the usual time. The most potent advice was novel recipes. However, questioning revealed that none of the ingredients was actually new and a subsequent test involving the husband confirmed that the recipes were not novel but rather variations on one theme. The main evidence that the voice was a prophet was that it spoke in Arabic, directed her to pages of the Koran, and knew her thoughts. M acknowledged that this evidence was equally consistent with the view that the voice was self generated. As therapy progressed, M practised planning each day's activity the preceding night and thereby increasing her autonomy.
Therapy lasted 18 weekly sessions, some involving her husband, and conviction in all four beliefs weakened considerably over this time (Table 2 ). This improvement was confirmed by her psychiatrist, who also noted a significant liftin mood, confidenceand self-initiated behaviour. M volunteered thatthevoicewas less intrusive and regarded it more as an irritation. These benefits led to her returning to work. and her beginning to act on them with possible danger to herself and her family. During her stay in hospital she was treated with neuroleptics, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) and antidepressants, with no effect. There were no negative symptoms but N was moderately depressed as a result of the prolonged admission. Neuroleptics were stopped three weeks into the study and not resumed until a maintenance dose was initiated towards the close of therapy. N heard one voice through her ears that announced itself as God. The voice commanded her to kill herself, members of her familyand a work colleague(â€oeDo your work, kill herâ€•, â€oe¿ Go to the canalâ€•). Also, the voice sometimes accused persons who were not family members of being evil and advised her against talking to them. On average the voice spoke in ten-minute episodes ten times a day. These episodes were linked to visual hallucinations of her dead daughter and her dog, who â€oe¿ came to herâ€•at night and beckoned her to join them in heaven by obeying God's commands. In this vein, at times N carried a knife with her, although she susbsequently suggested that this was an act of appeasement.
N believed the voice to be God, although she was puzzled why God should compel her to murder and suicide. She also believed that she could not control the voice and that if she resistedpunishmentwouldensue. Consequentlyshe stopped talking and listened carefully when it spoke, and appeased it by shadowing commands and going a small way towards compliance (e.g. carrying a knife).
CT spanned three months, with short meetings held regularly. A central consideration that engaged N in collaborative empiricism was the question: â€oe¿ Just suppose that this is not the voice of God, what then would be the consequence of compliance?â€•. N was already puzzled by why God should compel her to murder and suicide as this went against her Catholic faith (she was classified as uncertain in Study 1). The doubt that the voice was God was increased when she was invited to consider the wisdom of the voice's plan of how she was to complete the murders â€"¿ essentially, kill one person in a public place and then take a 12-mile bus journey to complete the mission. The belief that disobedience brought punishment was disputed by pointing outthatshehad resisted thecommands forthree years, and sometimes even ignored the voice, using distraction. There was much additional support for the belief that the voice was self-generated. It worsened when she thought about her daughter and dog and eased when she used concurrent verbalisation, so displaying that she could control the voice. The visions were illogical and went against her faith â€"¿ the dog spoke, whereas her faith stated that animals were without souls and could not enter heaven; her daughter â€˜¿ aged' over the years when ageing should not occur in heaven.
The outcome of treatment was very good. As is shown in Table 2 , her conviction in the three beliefs fell dramatically.
N is a 59-year-old woman with a 16-year psychiatric history, and visual and auditory hallucinations dating back Also, she came to doubt strongly the identity of the visions, and on those nights when these troubled her she was able to turn over and ignore them. These changes were corroborated by her psychiatrist and she was granted increasing home leave which hitherto had been thought too dangerous.
At the time of writing there had been no hallucinations in either modality for 2 months.
Case 3. D I) is a 41-year-old single unemployed economics graduate with a ten-year psychiatric history. For the last three years she had heard voices daily, in half-hour bursts, usually in the morning and at bedtime. The content was invariably to do with economics, such as: â€˜¿ â€˜¿ Infinitelypower the rise in inflationâ€• , â€oe¿ Negativelypower productivity a million, trillion times' â€˜¿ . These and similar statements were usually perceived as commands and occasionally as predictions. D also held a delusional belief that she could transmit her thoughts using telepathy.
D believed the voice to come from the Devil, and that he was using her telepathic power to destroy the British economy. Specifically, the Devil would give a command that in economic terms was disastrous, D would be compelled to repeat this command and in so doing would unwittingly transmit it telepathically to the Prime Minister, who would act upon it. She believed that if she resisted, the economy would be saved but the voice would continue to torment her. These beliefs had a profound impact. Each time the voice began she would resist by saying exactly the opposite of the command, until she finally weakened and repeated the Devil's command, when the voice would stop. She monitored the economy religiously and felt guilt, anger and depression when it dipped.
Therapy lasted for 13 sessions spaced over six months. Each session lasted one to two hours. CT raised a number of doubts in D's mind about her beliefs. For example, how was the Prime Minister to know that he was to act on the commands, and even should he know this, what does â€oe¿ infinitely powerâ€• require? Again, on the one hand she believed that repeating the Devil's commands would destroy the economy and yet she reluctantly did repeat the commands on many occasions. The belief about compliance was tested rigorously. The method used was that a command be chosen and D repeat it up to 100 times and wait to see if disaster ensued. This was done sequentially with commands demanding enormous increases in the cost of bus fares, the cost of milk, the inflation rate, the interest rates, and the level of personal taxation. In all these the beliefs were refuted.
Initially CT worked well for D. Conviction in all four beliefs about the voice fell and she lost the certainty that she had telepathic power (a fall from 100% to 50Â°7o). Also, she reported feeling less guilty and depressed, and a reduction in voice activity. Follow-up She heard three voicestalking in the second or third person inside her head, and â€˜¿ recognised' these voices as old school friends. The content was hostile and threatening (â€oeWe won't be so lenient next time, we're going to make your eyes roll upâ€•, â€oe¿ Look at her eyesâ€•, â€oe¿ You can't get rid of usâ€•).T's eyes did frequently roll up in what appeared to be an ocular spasm. The voices also taunted her about a peccadillo from her youth. She had full insight, but felt caught in the voices' power. Accordingly, the beliefs selected were that if she did not do what the voices said they would make her eyes roll up, that if she tried to talk when hallucinating it would be gibberish, and that she could not control the voices CT took place fortnightly for about 18 months and then every two months for a year. In the case of T the understandable concern about questioning the voices' authority was confounded by concern that work colleagues might discover her problem. However, she engaged well in collaborative discussion of alternative viewpoints and gained direct disconfirmation of all beliefs during CT. It was discussed how the eye rolling might be a spasm provoked jointly by tension and her coping strategy of fixed staring when hallucinating. She explored this by not leaving the workplace when the voices instructed. She found that eye rolling occurred regardless of whether she complied with the voices and that relaxation methods shortened the spasm. Similarly she discovered not only that talking over the voices was possible (initially she simply named objects in the room) but that it actually silenced them, and that her speech, although restricted, was far from gibberish. Finally, using this strategy in combination with resisting the voices allowed T to experience how she could indeed control them.
Conviction in all beliefs fell dramatically (see Table 2 ). She described a sense of liberation from the voices and a consequent increase in social activity. These improvements were corroborated by the referring psychiatrist. Also, frequency of voice activity was monitored throughout the study (see Fig. 1 ). Over a lengthy baseline period it fell slightly and then settled at 70â€"75 minutes a day for four months; it fell abruptly during CT to around 25 minutes a day, where it remained at follow-up.
Comment
Study 2 describes how the cognitive framework described earlier has spawned a new treatment for drug-resistant auditory hallucinations. The therapy involves disputing and testing the central beliefs these voices are maintained by reinforcing affective and behavioural consequences, and that as these weaken the voice activity is gradually extinguished. The possibility that malevolent and benevolent voices are maintained through different psychological processes begs the question of whether challenging beliefs about voices is always beneficial. Given that malevolent voices appear to provoke mainly fear, distress and resistance, it might be presumed that reduced voice activity was desired by all. In contrast, benevolent voices are usually courted and produce positive emotional responses; because of this, reduction or loss of the voices may be less desirable both to the individual and to carers, who may perhaps fear a concurrent reduction in self-esteem. In the present study two women saw their voices as malevol ent, one as benevolent, and one was uncertain, and yet therapy seemed to work well for each with no obvious untoward consequence. At present we are running a larger trial to examine whether the success of cognitive therapy depends in part on these categories.
The cognitive model embodied in the present paper has some important implications for treatment. Firstly, it implies that simply advising patients to use a differ ent coping strategy is unlikely to be helpful because of the probable conflict with central beliefs. For example, if a person believes that the voices are malevolent and intolerant of disobedience, he or she may be reluctant to employ distraction techniques. A second impli cation is that a lot of effort needs to go into establishing rapport, trust, and confidence, because the voices have a strong emotional and cognitive hold over the patients. A fmal implication is that if therapy is successful the person will inevitably come to see the voices as self-generated. In this sense, cognitive therapy for voices may be said to contribute to an individual's level of insight.
Although the methodology and measurement used were not sophisticated, the data and the reports from the responsible psychiatrists give the cognitive approach clinical validity. In no way could these cases be proof of the cognitive model of voices, nor is it suggested that they prove the efficacy of the cognitive therapy. Rather, the purpose is to present provisional support for a new approach to the understanding and treatment of voices, one that emphasises the necessity of appreciating the patient's efforts to under stand and structure the experience of hearing voices. patients hold about their voices: namely, those of identity, meaning, power and compliance. Clinically significant and stable reductions in the strength of the beliefs were reported in three cases described. These improvements were corroborated by the psychiatrists concerned, and led to other changes in objective burden. Thus, M returned to work, T became more active socially, and N was discharged from hospital â€"¿ an action which hitherto had been thought too dangerous for her and her family. contrast to the â€˜¿ coping strategy' approach (Falloon & Talbot, 1981; Brier & Strauss, 1983; Tarrier, 1987) which rather assumed that behavioural and affective responses (â€˜copingstrategies') are as it were randomly assigned to hallucinators. The first experiment offers provisional evidence that different â€˜¿ coping strategies' appear to be driven by differences in underlying beliefs about voices, which in our sample was meaningfully captured by the malevolence/benevolence distinction. Without exception, voices were seen as omnipotentindeed, the presumed identity of a voice was almost always one traditionally associated with omnipotence. For many patients this attribution was supported by an experience of control, by fantastic visual hallucinations, and by the patient having no influence over the voice. Also, all voices were seen as omniscient, again emphasising their superhuman quality. These indications of omnipotence combine to imbue voices with a â€˜¿ terrifyingand compelling quality' so that people feel caught in their power (Bauer, 1969, p. 199) . A critical part of CT with voices is to refute the belief in omnipotence and to test the possibility that the patient may learn to regulate the activity of the voices. Given the degree of fear and reverence involved, we believe that an open and collaborative atmosphere is vital.
The patients' beliefs displayed considerable effort after meaning (Bruner, 1957) and went well beyond the information given (i.e. content). Indeed, many times beliefs were at odds with content. There was also evidence of verbal regulation of behaviour, a normal process whereby strongly held beliefs can drive the way in which we behave, feel, and interpret events (Vygotsky, 1962) . For example, one man reported how he swore out loud in church, and how he subsequently deduced that his powerful and malevolent voice had been responsible for this action. In this regard, the voices' perceived omnipotence and omniscience are pertinent because people are more likely to apportion blame to those with authority, knowledge and ability (Tennen & Affleck, 1990) . What this points to is the fact that people's subjective experience of voices is not an irrelevant by-product but an active and potent influence. Strauss puts his finger on this point precisely: â€oe¿ When closer attention is paid to patients' reports of their experiences, one key phenomenon suggested is the importance of the interaction between the person and the disorder. This interaction evolves over time and has implications for understanding, studying, and treating schizophrenia and related disordersâ€•. (Strauss, 1989, p. 179) .
The explanatory power of the cognitive model was weakest in relation to compliance. In our group the severity of the command, and not beliefs, was the single most important determinant of compliance â€"¿ there was no compliance with life-threatening commands, and compliance with mild commands was commonplace.
This At present we are interviewing people who have acted on serious commands, to investigate whether such compliance is associated with factors specific to the hallucinatory experience (e.g. total certainty in the beliefs) or more general predictors of violence (e.g. previous history). The precise importance of beliefs within a cognitive formulation is currently under review. In its early form, the cognitive position took a simple one-way causal model that gave cognition primacy over affect. The fmding that affect may also determine cognition has meant that new reciprocal models now predominate (e.g. Gilbert, 1984) . In relation to voices, our position is that beliefs are vital to the maintenance of affective and behavioural responses and render them understandable.
Reciprocally, behaviour and affect strengthen or weaken beliefs.
It is probably futile to assert primacy for either cognition or emotion, because starting points in dynamic reciprocal sequences are arbitrarily defined, and because both responses are forever evolving (see Parkinson & Manstead, 1992) . What can be asserted is that the affective, cognitive and behavioural responses evolve together and are always meaningfully related. In the present study, behavioural and affective responses to voices were always understandable in the light of the beliefs; without recourse to the beliefs many responses would have seemed incongruous. Indeed, one advantage of a cognitive formulation is that it draws out the structure and meaning that exist within a person's subjective experience of illness â€"¿ something which is often disregarded or overlooked within psychiatry (Strauss, 1989) . The two studies reported are preliminary exper iments that require replicating. The critical concepts of malevolence, benevolence and omnipotence need clear operational definitions and the measurement and methodology need to be tightened. Should the results prove to be typical, we believe they have major implications for the treatment of drug-resistant psychotic auditory hallucinations. An assumption of previous approaches to voice management has been that alleviating distress is contingent upon eliminating the experience, and this has led to therapies such as monaural occlusion and distraction (Birchwood, 1986) or indeed pharmacotherapy. Against this, the present research strongly suggests that degree of distress is inextricably bound to subjective meaning, and that weakening critical beliefs about the voices might alleviate much of the associated distress and difficulty.
